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a b s t r a c t 
As a special type of fault injection attacks, Related-Key Attacks (RKAs) allow an adversary 
to manipulate a cryptographic key and subsequently observe the outcomes of the crypto- 
graphic scheme under these modiﬁed keys. In the real life, related-key attacks are already 
practical enough to be implemented on cryptographic devices. To avoid cryptographic de- 
vices suffering from related-key attacks, it is necessary to design a cryptographic scheme 
that resists against such attacks. This paper proposes an eﬃcient RKA-secure Key Encap- 
sulation Mechanism (KEM), in which the adversary can modify the secret key sk to any 
value f ( sk ), as long as, f is a polynomial function of a bounded degree d . Especially, the 
polynomial-RKA security can be reduced to a hard search problem, namely d -extended 
computational Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman (BDH) problem, in the standard model. Our con- 
struction essentially reﬁnes the security of Haralambiev et al.’s BDH-based KEM scheme 
from chosen-ciphertext security to related-key security. The main technique applied in our 
scheme is the re-computation of the public key in the decryption algorithm so that any 
(non-trivial) modiﬁcation to the secret key can be detected. 
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
To characterize security for a cryptographic scheme, we generally set up a security model to formalize the attacks from 
adversaries, and deﬁne security notions for the scheme. Most of security models assume that any adversary has only a 
black-box access to the algorithms of the scheme. In other words, the adversary has no information about the internal 
states of the algorithms, hence is not able to modify the secret key. While this assumption might be reasonable for some 
settings, there still exists a gap between the idealized assumption and practices. For instance, in the context of side-channel 
attacks on a hardware device, an adversary can obtain partial information about the secret key, by means of timing [34] , 
“cold-boot” [25] and fault injection [9,11] , etc. Relate-Key Attacks (RKAs) are just a type of fault injection attacks. By 
implementing RKAs on a device, an adversary is not only capable of modifying the original secret key, but also able to 
observe the output of the device under these modiﬁed keys. Biham [8] and Knudsen [33] gave the ﬁrst security analysis for 
some block-ciphers in the scenario of related-key attacks. At the same time, RKAs also impose great threats on public key 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: qinbaodong@foxmail.com (B. Qin), slliu@sjtu.edu.cn (S. Liu), crypto99@sjtu.edu.cn (S. Sun), robertdeng@smu.edu.sg (R.H. Deng), 
dwgu@sjtu.edu.cn (D. Gu). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2017.04.018 
0020-0255/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
Published in Information Sciences, 2017 April, Volume 406-407, Pages - 1
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2017.04.018
2 B. Qin et al. / Information Sciences 406–407 (2017) 1–11 
cryptosystems. For example, the well-known CRT-based RSA signature scheme [11] can be completely broken, even if only 
one bit of the signing key is tampered by the adversary. However, it seems diﬃcult to deﬁne a formal security model to 
capture related-key attacks, as it is hard to precisely depict the adversary’s tampering capacity. Recently, Bellare and Kohno 
made an effort on modelling RKAs. They deﬁned a set of functions  to capture the adversary’s tampering ability to the 
secret key. Informally, a -RKA adversary is able to choose any function φ ∈  to modify the secret key s in a device to a 
new key s ′ = φ(s ) , then observe the input/output of the device under the new key s ′ . In other words, the adversary knows 
the relationship between the original key and the modiﬁed key, though it may not know their real values. For concrete 
cryptographic primitives, the -RKA adversary may also have other abilities, e.g., access to a decryption oracle in the 
setting of public-key encryption, or access to a signing oracle in the setting of digital signature. In this paper, we focus on 
Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), and review KEM with its RKA security [5,41] . 
1.1. RKA security 
Normally, a KEM scheme consists of a system parameter generation algorithm, a public key/secret key generation 
algorithm, a session key encryption algorithm and a decryption algorithm. The RKA security model assumes that the system 
parameter and those algorithms (program code) cannot be manipulated by the adversary, as they are ﬁxed beforehand and 
independent of users. However, the adversary is able to tamper with the secret key (decryption key). The power of an RKA 
adversary is parameterized by a class  of functions, also called Related-Key Derivation (RKD) functions, which is used 
by the adversary to modify the secret key sk ∗. Informally, a KEM scheme is -RKA secure if the challenge ciphertext C ∗
remains secure even if the adversary obtains the decryption of any ciphertext C under any modiﬁed secret key φ( sk ∗) as 
long as φ ∈ , and ( φ( sk ∗), C ) does not match the pair of challenge secret key and ciphertext ( sk ∗, C ∗). 
The main line of research in RKA security is to construct cryptographic primitives that are provably secure against larger 
classes of RKD functions. Many practical constructions have been proposed with respect to linear functions [4,5,18,19,41] , 
aﬃne functions [2,31,32,35] , polynomials [2,7,35] and even any invertible functions [21,40] . However, to achieve larger 
classes of RKD functions, these schemes usually rely on much stronger assumptions, such as the d -Extended Decisional 
Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman ( d -EDBDH) used in [7] . In general, the harder a problem is, the stronger the assumption associated 
with the problem is, and the adversary will take more time to break it. It is believed that computational assumptions 
from search problems are a much weaker class of assumptions than the corresponding decisional versions. For example, 
in bilinear pairing groups, the Decisional Diﬃe–Hellman (DDH) assumption does not hold anymore, but its computational 
version, namely Computational Diﬃe–Hellman (CDH) problem, appears to be hard. So it is prefer to design a scheme based 
on much weaker assumptions associated with hard search problems. By this observation, recent development on security 
of PKE against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) sees many practical constructions from various search problems, such as 
factoring [29] and CDH problems [14] . However, there are still very few RKA-secure schemes from hard search problems, 
especially for large class of RKD functions. In 2012, Wee [41] gave the ﬁrst RKA-secure PKE scheme from factoring. But the 
security was only proved for linear RKD functions. It seems that RKA security from search problems is very hard to obtain 
especially for non-linear RKD functions. 
1.2. Our contribution 
Our main contribution is a non-linear RKA secure KEM scheme from a hard search problem, namely d -Extended 
computational Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman ( d -EBDH), in the standard model. The d -EBDH problem states that 
Given (g, g α, g α
2 
, . . . , g α
d 
, g β, g γ ) , to compute T = e (g, g) αβγ . 
This is a computational version of the d -EDBDH problem used by Bellare, Paterson and Thomson for constructing RKA 
secure IBE and KEM. The d -EDBDH problem is hard in the generic group model [39] . Obviously, the d -EBDH problem is at 
least as hard as the d -EDBDH problem and might be even harder. 
1.3. Overview of our technique 
Recall that in the traditional CCA-security, one of the technical diﬃculties in the security proof is how to simulate the 
decryption queries without the target secret key. To solve this problem, except for the approach using hash proof system 
proposed by Cramer and Shoup [16] , most of the CCA-secure PKE/KEM schemes e.g., [13,27,28,37] , used the “all-but-one”
technique, which allows one to set up the system parameter and public key so that one can decrypt all ciphertexts except 
for one single challenge ciphertext. If CCA security is lifted to RKA security, the problem becomes more challenging since 
we need to answer decryption queries under not only the target secret key, but also many related keys. To solve this 
problem, our strategy is the use of a “seed” malleable KEM scheme, together with the “all-but-one” technique. Here, the 
“seed” is a middle value generated during the decryption. But it can be used to correctly recover the ﬁnal session key. In 
addition, validity of a ciphertext is publicly checkable and hence is independent of the secret key. As a result, we can derive 
a seed from a valid ciphertext under the original key. By the “seed” malleability, we further compute the right seed w.r.t. 
the modiﬁed key and hence the ﬁnal session key. This strategy works well unless an adversary query decryption with the 
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Fig. 1. CCA-secure HJKS-KEM and RKA-secure variant of HJKS-KEM. 
challenge ciphertext under a key that is distinct from the original secret key. To solve this problem, we use a simple trick 
of hashing the public key into the ciphertext. The secret key is bound with the public key. If the secret key is modiﬁed, so 
is the public key and hence the ciphertext. This prevents the adversary from reusing the challenge ciphertext. 
A candidate for CCA-secure KEM scheme in our construction is a BDH-based KEM scheme proposed by Haralambiev, 
Jager, Kiltz, and Shoup [26] (denoted by HJKS-KEM). We review it as well as our scheme (a variant HJKS-KEM) in Fig. 1 . 
In Fig. 1 , f gl ( ·, R ) is a Goldreich–Levin hard-core function and TCR is a target collision-resistant hash function. The seed 
used in our proof is a sequence of values Z r 
i . The “seed” malleability is deﬁned as follows: given Z 
r 
i and (g, g 
α, . . . , g α
d 
) , for 
any polynomial RKD function φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d (x ) = 
∑ d 
i =0 a i x 
i , it is feasible to derive ˆ e(g 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i 
, Z r 
i ) which equals the right “seed”
ˆ e(C 
φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d (α) 
0 , Z i ) w.r.t. RKD function φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d . From these right “seeds”, it is easy to recover the right encapsulated key 
K . In the proof, to derive the “seeds” Z r 
i without the knowledge of α, we employ the “all-but-one” technique, similar to that 
in the proof of CCA security of HJKS-KEM scheme. Note that, the elements (g α
2 
, . . . , g α
d 
) are only used in the proof, and 
hence they do not amplify the key sizes of the original HJKS-KEM scheme. In addition, the variant of HJKS-KEM scheme is 
as eﬃcient as the original HJKS-KEM scheme except for adding one more exponent operation in decryption . 
Discussion. Very recently, Cui et al. [20] studied the relations between robustness (discussed in TCC 2010 by Abdalla 
et al. [1] ) and RKA security under public-key encryption. One of their results [20 , Theorem 4] shows that a completely 
robust PKE scheme is also RKA secure with respect to the restricted RKD functions. Moreover, a CCA-secure PKE can be made 
to completely robust via a commitment scheme. The restricted RKD functions should satisfy the following three properties: 
• Malleability. Given an RKD function φ and a decryption key sk , there should exist an algorithm which outputs a decryp- 
tion key sk’ under φ that is distributed identically to the output of φ( sk ). 
• Compatibility. Given an RKD function φ, an encryption pk , and a decryption sk , there should exist a key generation 
algorithm outputting a key pair ( pk ′ , sk ′ )  = ( pk, sk ), where sk ′ = φ(sk ) and the corresponding pk ′ can be eﬃciently 
generated from φ and pk . 
• Collision resistance. Given RKD functions φ1 , φ2 , and a decryption key sk, φ1 ( sk ) should not be equal to φ2 ( sk ) if φ1  = 
φ2 . 
The collision resistance actually requires the RKD functions be claw-free (introduced by Bellare and Cash at CRYPTO 
2010 [4] ). It seems that the key generation algorithm of the BHJK-KEM scheme meets the above requirements with respect 
to polynomial RKD functions under the d -EBDH assumption. However, the polynomial functions are not claw-free. We 
believe that the concrete instantiation of Cui et al.’s framework for polynomial functions can remove this restriction of 
collision resistance. The reason is as follows. For any bounded-degree polynomial over ﬁnite ﬁeld, there exists eﬃcient 
algorithm to compute all its roots. If φ1 (sk ) = φ2 (sk ) , we may ﬁnd the target decryption key sk from the roots of the 
polynomial equation f (x ) = φ1 (x ) − φ2 (x )= 0. Under the d -EBDH assumption, the restricted RKD functions may not be 
larger than d -degree polynomials, as the property of compatibility requires the encryption key pk ′ corresponding to φ( sk ) 
be publicly computed from the challenge pk (including the system parameter) and the RKD function φ. 
1.4. Related work 
In 2003, Bellare and Kohno [6] initiated a theoretical investigation of RKA security for PRFs and PRPs. Since then, the 
study of RKA security has been extended to other primitives [3–5,7,22,24,35,36] . Particularly, in 2011, Bellare, Cash and 
Miller [5] showed the relations among RKA primitives of PRFs, IBE, PKE, signature, symmetric encryption and weak PRFs. 
They showed the following results: RKA-PRFs can be used to construct all the other RKA primitives; -RKA secure IBE 
yields -RKA secure PKE with the BCHK transformation [10] ; -RKA signature can be obtained with the IBE-to-Signature 
transformation of Naor (mentioned in [12] ). Though RKA-PRFs play an important role in RKA-secure primitives, it was 
not until 2014 that the problem to construct non-linear RKA-PRFs was solved by Abdalla, Benhamouda, Passelègue and 
Paterson [2] . Concretely, they presented a RKA-secure PRFs under the stronger decisional d -Diﬃe–Hellman assumption for a 
class of polynomial RKD functions of bounded degree d . In 2012, Bellare, Paterson and Thomson [7] proposed a framework 
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for constructing RKA-secure IBE, including the non-linear (polynomials of bounded degree d ) RKA secure IBE based on the 
d -EDBDH assumption. In the same year, Wee [41] presented a framework for constructing linear-RKA secure PKE schemes 
from standard assumptions, including factoring and DBDH. In addition, the author introduced the notion of weaker RKA 
security, in which the adversary is allowed to make decryption queries that are not equal to the challenge ciphertext. 
A general approach to RKA security is making use of continuous non-malleable codes [30] or continuous non-malleable 
key derivation [38] . In these two primitives, the real cryptographic key is encoded into a codeword or is derived from 
a seed. If the codeword or the seed is modiﬁed to another one, the new recovered cryptographic key is either equal to 
the original key or independent of the original key. Very recently, Chen et al. showed that continuous non-malleable key 
derivation can be obtained from non-malleable functions [15] . 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Notation 
Throughout this paper, we denote by κ the security parameter and by negl (κ) a negligible function in κ , that is, for any 
positive integer c , there exists N such that for all κ > N , negl (κ) < 1 /κc . For a ﬁnite set S , we use s 
$ ← S to represent the 
operation of sampling s uniformly at random from S . We write with poly( κ) an unspeciﬁed polynomial value of κ . “PPT”
and “DPT” stand for probabilistic polynomial-time and deterministic polynomial-time respectively. For a positive integer n , 
we denote by [ n ] the set { 1 , . . . , n } and by [ n i ] the set { 1 , . . . , i − 1 , i + 1 , . . . , n } . 
2.2. Key-encapsulation mechanism 
Bellare, Paterson and Thomson [7 , Theorem 7.1] showed that the KEM/DEM paradigm of [17] extends to the RKA setting 
in a natural way. Therefore this paper will focus on key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) schemes rather than public-key 
encryption schemes. 
A key-encapsulation mechanism scheme consists of four (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms: ( KEM . Sys , KEM . Gen , 
KEM . Encap , KEM . Decap ) that satisfy the following properties: (1) KEM . Sys (1 κ ) is a PPT parameter generation algorithm. 
It takes as input a security parameter 1 κ and outputs a system parameter sp (which implicitly deﬁnes an encapsulated 
key space K and a ciphertext space C); (2) KEM . Gen (sp) is a PPT public key and secret key generation algorithm. It 
takes as input the system parameter sp and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk ; (3) KEM . Encap (pk ) is a PPT 
encapsulation algorithm. It takes as input the public key pk and outputs a ciphertext C as well as a random symmetric 
key (session key) K ∈ K; (4) KEM . Decap (sk, C) is a DPT decapsulation algorithm. It takes as input a ciphertext C and a 
secret key sk , and outputs a symmetric key K ∈ K or the special reject symbol ⊥ , indicating that C is an invalid ciphertext. 
The consistence requires that for all κ ∈ N , all possible system parameter sp ← KEM . Sys (1 κ ) and public/secret key pair 
(pk, sk ) ← KEM . Gen (sp) , and all (C, K) ← Encap (pk ) , it always has KEM . Decap (sk, C) = K. 
RKD functions. Suppose that S is a ﬁnite set. Let F = { f : S → S} denote the set of all eﬃciently computable functions 
with the same domain and range S . Moreover, their relationships should be eﬃciently checkable. We say a class of functions 
 is a related-key derivation (RKD) function class, if it is a subset of F . In this paper, S is just the secret key space and the 
RKD functions may depend on the system parameters. Hereafter, we write with lin , aff and poly the concrete classes of 
linear, aﬃne and polynomial RKD functions respectively. 
Following [7] , we deﬁne the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext and related-key attacks for RKD 
function class  (abbreviated as -RKA security) for a KEM scheme. 
Deﬁnition 1 ( -RKA security) . We say that a key-encapsulation mechanism KEM = ( KEM . Sys , KEM . Gen , KEM . Encap , 
KEM . Decap ) is -RKA secure, if for any stateful PPT adversary A , the following advantage 
Adv −rka KEM , A (κ) := 
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎣ b ′ = b : 
sp ∗ ← KEM . Sys (1 κ ) 
(pk ∗, sk ∗) ← KEM . Gen (sp ∗) 
(C ∗, K ∗0 ) ← KEM . Encap (pk ∗) 
K ∗1 
$ ← K, b $ ← { 0 , 1 } 
b ′ ← A O sk ∗ (·, ·) (pk ∗, (C ∗, K ∗
b )) 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎦ −
1 
2 
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
is negligible in κ , where the RKA oracle O 
sk ∗ (·, ·) , on input (φ, C) ∈  × C, returns KEM . Decap (φ(sk ∗) , C) . Naturally, the 
adversary is forbidden to make queries such that (φ(sk ∗) , C) = (sk ∗, C ∗) once the adversary saw the challenge ciphertext C ∗. 
2.3. Target collision-resistant hash function 
Let H = { TCR : R → D} be a family of hash functions from domain D to range R . For simplicity, we denote by TCR ← H
the function sampling algorithm. Actually, this would be a PPT algorithm that takes as input the security parameter and 
outputs a function index. The target collision-resistant hash functions says that given a hash function TCR and a random 
x ∈ D, it is hard to ﬁnd x ′  = x such that TCR (x ′ ) = TCR (x ) . 
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Deﬁnition 2 (TCR Hash Function) . We say that a hash function family H = { TCR : R → D} is target collision resistant, if for 
any PPT algorithm A , the following advantage 
Adv tcr H, A (κ) := Pr 
[
x ′  = x ∧ TCR (x ′ ) = TCR (x ) : TCR ← H, x 
$ ← D 
x ′ ← A ( TCR , x ) 
]
is negligible in κ . 
2.4. Extended bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman assumption 
A pairing instance generation algorithm PGen (1 κ ) is a PPT algorithm that on input 1 κ , outputs a description of bilinear 
groups ( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) . This paper considers bilinear groups with prime order p and symmetric bilinear map, i.e., there exists 
an eﬃciently compubable map ˆ e : G × G → G T such that ˆ e(g a , g b ) = ˆ e(g b , g a ) = ˆ e(g, g) ab for any a, b ∈ Z p and g ∈ G . We 
simply denote by g 
$ ← G \ { 1 } a random generator sampling algorithm, where 1 stands for the identity element. 
For any positive integer d = poly (κ) , the d -Extended Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman ( d -EBDH) problem over bilinear group G 
states that 
Given (( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) , g, g 
α, g α
2 
, . . . , g α
d 
, g β, g γ ) , to compute T = ˆ e(g, g) αβγ , 
where ( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) ← PGen (1 κ ) , g $ ← G \ { 1 } and α, β, γ $ ← Z p . 
Clearly, if d = 1 , this is just the standard computational Bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman (BDH) problem. 
Deﬁnition 3 ( d -EBDH Assumption) . We say that the d -EBDH assumption holds over G , if for any PPT algorithm A , it solves 
the d -EBDH problem with a negligible probability in κ , where the probability is deﬁned as follows 
Adv d −ebdh A , G (κ) := Pr 
⎡ 
⎣ T = ˆ e(g, g) αβγ : 
( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) ← PGen (1 κ ) 
g 
$ ← G \ { 1 } , α, β, γ $ ← Z p 
T ← A (g, g α, g α2 , . . . , g αd , g β, g γ ) 
⎤ 
⎦ . 
In the following, we denote by f gl : G T × { 0 , 1 } u → { 0 , 1 } ν the Goldreich–Levin hard-core function for d -EBDH problem 
with randomness space {0, 1} u and range {0, 1} ν , where u and ν are suitable positive integers. The Goldreich–Levin 
theorem [23] gives the following lemma. 
Lemma 1. For ( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) ← PGen (1 κ ) . Deﬁne two distributions 
	real = (g, g α, g α
2 
, . . . , g α
d 
, g β, g γ , K, R ) 
	rand = (g, g α, g α
2 
, . . . , g α
d 
, g β, g γ , U ν, R ) 
where g is a random generator of group G , α, β, γ
$ ← Z p , R $ ← { 0 , 1 } u , K = f gl ( ˆ  e(g, g) αβγ , R ) and U ν $ ← { 0 , 1 } ν . For any PPT 
algorithm A , the following advantage 
Adv d−ebdh GL, B (κ) := | Pr [ A (	real ) = 1] − Pr [ A (	rand ) = 1] | 
is negligible in κ under the d-EBDH assumption. In other words, if the d-EBDH assumption holds, then no PPT algorithm can 
distinguish the aforementioned two distributions 	real and 	rand . 
3. RKA-secure KEM from the EBDH assumption 
3.1. The construction 
• KEM . Sys (1 κ ) : Run ( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) ← PGen (1 κ ) . Choose f gl : G T × { 0 , 1 } u → { 0 , 1 } ν and randomness R $ ← { 0 , 1 } u for f gl . 
Choose a function TCR from a target collision-resistant hash function family H = { TCR : G × G → Z p } . Choose a random 
generator g 
$ ← G \ { 1 } and random elements X, X ′ , Z 1 , . . . , Z n $ ← G . Return 
sp = 
(
( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) , f gl , R, TCR , g, X, X 
′ , Z 1 , . . . , Z n 
)
. 
• KEM . Gen (sp) : Given a system parameter sp , choose a random exponent α
$ ← Z p , and compute Y = g α . Set 
pk = Y and sk = α
and return ( pk, sk ). 
• KEM . Encap (pk ) : On input a public key pk = Y, pick r $ ← Z p and then compute 
C 0 = g r C 1 = (X t X ′ ) r K = 
(
f gl ( ˆ  e(Y 
r , Z i ) , R ) 
)
i ∈ [ n ] 
where t = TCR (C 0 , Y ) . Return (( C 0 , C 1 ), K ). 
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• KEM . Decap (sk, (C 0 , C 1 )) : On input the secret key sk = α and a ciphertext ( C 0 , C 1 ), compute Y = g α and t = TCR (C 0 , Y ) . If 
ˆ e(C 0 , X 
t X ′ )  = ˆ e(g, C 1 ) , then return ⊥ . Otherwise, compute, for each i ∈ [ n ], 
K i = f gl ( ˆ  e(C α0 , Z i ) , R ) 
and return K = (K 1 , . . . , K n ) ∈ { 0 , 1 } nν . 
The correctness of the above scheme can be checked directly, we omit it here. Its security is established by the following 
theorem. 
Our RKD functions: The related-key derivation function class poly( d ) used in the following theorem consists of all 
polynomials with bounded degree d over the ﬁnite ﬁeld F p , where p is the prime order of group G . Without loss of 
generality, for any φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d ∈ poly (d) , the evaluation of polynomial 
∑ d 
i =0 a i x 
i is over the ﬁnite ﬁeld F p . 
Theorem 1. Suppose that f gl is a Goldreich–Levin hard-core function, H is a target collision-resistant hash function family and 
the d-Extended Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman assumption holds in G . Then, the above scheme is a poly( d ) -RKA secure KEM scheme. 
Concretely, for any PPT poly( d ) -RKA adversary A that makes at most q = poly (κ) RKA queries, there exist adversaries B ′ and B ′′ 
of roughly the same complexity as A , such that 
Adv 
poly (d) −rka 
KEM , A (κ) ≤ Adv tcr H, B ′ (κ) + n · Adv d−ebdh GL, B ′′ (κ) + 
q 
p 
where p is the order of the underlying bilinear group G . 
3.2. Security proof 
Before to prove Theorem 1 , we brieﬂy discuss the RKA security of the original HJK S-KEM scheme. Though the HJK S-KEM 
scheme is CCA secure under the BDH assumption, it seems to be hard to prove its RKA security (even under the extended 
BDH assumption). Consider a (simple) linear RKD function class, the adversary can modify the challenge decryption key 
sk = α to some related decryption key, such as sk ′ = α + 1 . Given a challenge HJKS-KEM ciphertext (C ∗
0 , C 
∗
1 ) , we know that 
(C ∗0 , C 
∗
1 ) is still a valid ciphertext under the modiﬁed key sk 
′ (according to the validity checking of the HJKS-KEM scheme). 
Hence, submitting (φ = x + 1 , C := (C ∗
0 , C 
∗
1 )) to the RKA decryption oracle, the adversary should obtain a session key K 
′ = 
(K ′ 
1 , K 
′ 
2 , . . . , K 
′ 
n ) , where K 
′ 
i = f gl ( ˆ  e( C ∗0 α+1 , Z i ) , R ) . Note that the real session (challenge) key is (K i ) i ∈ [ n ] = ( f gl ( ˆ  e( C ∗0 α, Z i ) , R )) i ∈ [ n ] . 
It is not clear whether the adversary can derive some useful information about K i from the knowledge of K 
′ 
i . To prevent 
this related-key attack, K ′ should be unrelated to the challenge key K . However, the underlying hard-core function does not 
suggest such a property. We do not know how to prove the RKA security of the original HJKS-KEM scheme. Nevertheless, 
our variant HJKS-KEM scheme proposed in this paper can be formally proven to be RKA secure due to the following analysis. 
We proceed through a sequence of games played between a ﬁxed PPT adversary A and a challenger. Let S i denote the 
event that A succeeds (i.e., b ′ = b in Deﬁnition 1 ) in Game i . 
Game 0 : This is the original RKA game. By deﬁnition we have 
Adv 
poly (d) −rka 
KEM , A (κ) := 
∣∣∣Pr [ S 0 ] − 1 
2 
∣∣∣. 
In the following games, we denote by Y ∗, (C ∗
0 , C 
∗
1 ) and K 
∗
b the challenge public key, challenge ciphertext and challenge 
encapsulated key respectively, and denote by (φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d , (C 0 , C 1 )) the RKA queries issued by A . We write with Y φ the 
modiﬁed public key corresponding to the modiﬁed secret key φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d (α) , i.e., Y φ = g 
φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d (α) . 
Game 1 : This game is identical to Game 0 , except that the challenger rejects all RKA queries of the form 
(φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d , (C 0 , C 1 )) such that 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i = α and (C 0 , C 1 ) = (C ∗0 , C ∗1 ) . Recall that in the original RKA game, the challenger 
only rejects such queries after the adversary seeing the challenge ciphertext (C ∗
0 , C 
∗
1 ) . Since C 
∗
0 is chosen uniformly at random 
from G , the probability that the adversary submits an RKA query such that C 0 = C ∗0 before seeing the challenge ciphertext is 
bounded by q / p where q is the number of RKA queries issued by A . Since q = poly (κ) , we have q / p is negligible in κ . Then 
| Pr [ S 1 ] − Pr [ S 0 ] | ≤ q 
p 
. 
Game 2 : Instead of testing φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d (α) = α ( mod p) , the challenger checks whether Y φ = g 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i = Y ∗. That is, 
the challenger returns ⊥ , if A submits an RKA query of the form (φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d , (C 0 , C 1 )) such that g 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i = Y ∗ and 
(C 0 , C 1 ) = (C ∗0 , C ∗1 ) . Note that g is a generator of G with prime order p , and thus φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d (α) = α holds if and only if 
g 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i = Y ∗. This modiﬁcation is just conceptional and hence 
Pr [ S 2 ] = Pr [ S 1 ] . 
(The purpose of this game is to check the equivalency between the original secret key α and the modiﬁed secret key φ( α) 
using the public parameters (g, g α, g α
2 
, . . . , g α
d 
) rather than α.) 
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Game 3 : This game is identical to Game 2 , except the following modiﬁcation to the computation of Y . In the public/secret 
keys generation algorithm, besides the public key Y ∗ = g α, the challenger also computes Y ∗
i = g α
i 
for 2 ≤ i ≤ n and keeps 
them in hand. In the following, we implicitly set Y ∗0 = g and Y ∗1 = Y ∗. 
To answer A ’s query (φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d , (C 0 , C 1 )) , the challenger computes Y φ via 
d i =0 (Y ∗i ) a i instead of g 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i 
. Since 

d 
i =0 (Y 
∗
i ) 
a i = 
d 
i =0 (g 
αi ) a i = g 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i 
, we have 
Pr [ S 3 ] = Pr [ S 2 ] . 
Game 4 : This game is identical to Game 3 , except that the challenger returns ⊥ and halts, if (C 0 , Y φ ) = (C ∗0 , Y ∗) . Note that, in 
this case, t = TCR (C 0 , Y φ ) = TCR (C ∗0 , Y ∗) = t ∗. If C 1  = C ∗1 , then 
ˆ e(C 0 , X 
t X ′ ) = ˆ e(C ∗0 , X t 
∗
X ′ ) = ˆ e(g, C ∗1 )  = ˆ e(g, C 1 ) . 
Any RKA query such that (C 0 , Y φ ) = (C ∗0 , Y ∗) but C 1  = C ∗1 will be an inconsistent ciphertext and rejected by the decryption 
oracle. However if C 1 = C ∗1 , it will also be rejected by the deﬁnition. Therefore 
Pr [ S 4 ] = Pr [ S 3 ] . 
Game 5 : This game is identical to Game 4 , except that the challenger returns ⊥ and halts, if (C 0 , Y φ )  = (C ∗0 , Y ∗) but 
t = TCR (C 0 , Y φ ) = TCR (C ∗0 , Y ∗) = t ∗. By the target collision-resistance of TCR , we have the following lemma (which we do 
after the main proof): 
Lemma 2. Let B ′ be a PPT adversary attacking on the target collision-resistance of the hash function TCR . Then, 
| Pr [ S 5 ] − Pr [ S 4 ] | ≤ Adv tcr TCR , B ′ (κ) . 
Game 6 : This game is identical to Game 5 , except that the challenger samples K 
∗
0 
$ ← { 0 , 1 } nν instead of computing 
K ∗
0 = 
(
f gl ( ˆ  e( C 
∗
0 
α
, Z i ) , R ) 
)
i ∈ [ n ] . Note that, in this game both K 
∗
0 and K 
∗
1 are chosen uniformly at random and thereby we have 
Pr [ S 6 ] = 1 2 . 
We claim that 
| Pr [ S 6 ] − Pr [ S 5 ] | ≤ n · Adv d−ebdh GL, B ′′ (κ) . 
We prove the above claim through deﬁning a sequence of hybrid games H 0 , . . . , H n such that H 0 equals Game 5 . For i ∈ [ n ], 
H i is the same as H i −1 , except that the ﬁrst i ν bits of K ∗0 are chosen randomly and independently. Clearly, H n equals Game 6 . 
We prove that hybrid H i is indistinguishable from hybrid H i −1 in the successive games. 
Let E i denote the event that A succeeds in hybrid game H i . We ﬁx any index i ∗ ∈ [ n ]. Suppose that there 
exists a PPT adversary A that has a non-negligible advantage to distinguish games H i ∗ and H i ∗−1 . Then, we 
show that there exists an algorithm B i ∗ distinguishing the distributions 	real and 	rand . Given a challenge tuple 
δ = (( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) , g, g α, g α2 , . . . , g αd , g β , g γ , L, R ) , the algorithm B i ∗ proceeds as follows: 
Setting up the system parameter. B i ∗ chooses random exponents ω 1 , ω 2 ∈ Z p , and sets X = (g β ) ω 1 , X ′ = (g β ) −ω 1 t ∗g ω 2 , 
and Z i ∗ = g β , where t ∗ = TCR (g γ , g α) . For i ∈ [ n i ∗], B i ∗ picks random exponents z i ∈ Z p and sets Z i = g z i . Finally, B i ∗
returns the following system parameter to A 
sp = (( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) , f gl , R, TCR , g, X, X ′ , Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) . 
Clearly, the simulated system parameter has the same distribution as in that the original game. Note that B i ∗ knows 
the discrete logarithms of all Z i ’s to the base g , except Z i ∗ . 
Setting up the public key. B i ∗ sets pk := Y ∗ = g α and implicitly sets Y ∗i = g α
i 
for 0 ≤ i ≤ d . 
Setting up the challenge ciphertext. B i ∗ sets C ∗0 = g γ and C ∗1 = (g γ ) ω 2 . So, TCR (C ∗0 , Y ∗) = TCR (g γ , g α) = t ∗. According to 
the set-up of X and X ′ , it follows that 
(X t 
∗
X ′ ) γ = (((g β ) ω 1 ) t ∗ · (g β ) −ω 1 t ∗g ω 2 ) γ = (g γ ) ω 2 . 
So, (C ∗
0 , C 
∗
1 ) is a consistent ciphertext and has the same distribution as in Game 0 . 
Then B i ∗ randomly chooses the ﬁrst i ∗ − 1 keys K ∗0 , 1 , . . . , K ∗0 ,i ∗−1 , sets K ∗0 ,i ∗ := L, and computes K ∗0 , j = f gl ( ˆ  e(C ∗0 , Y ∗) z j , R ) 
for i ∗ + 1 ≤ j ≤ n . After that, B i ∗ lets K ∗0 = (K ∗0 , 1 , . . . , K ∗0 ,n ) , and samples K ∗1 = (K ∗1 , 1 , . . . , K ∗1 ,n ) 
$ ← { 0 , 1 } nν as in the origi- 
nal RKA game. Finally, B i ∗ picks a random coin b $ ← { 0 , 1 } and returns the challenge ciphertext (C ∗0 , C ∗1 ) together with 
the key K ∗
b to A . 
Handling RKA queries. Suppose that (φa 0 ,a 1 , ... ,a d , (C 0 , C 1 )) is an RKA query issued by A and suppose that C 0 = g r for some 
unknown exponent r ∈ Z p . B i ∗ computes Y φ = 
d i =0 (Y ∗i ) a i . If (C 0 , Y φ ) = (C ∗0 , Y ∗) or t = TCR (C 0 , Y φ ) = t ∗, B i ∗ returns ⊥ 
and halts. Otherwise, B i ∗ tests the consistency of the ciphertext by verifying ˆ e(C 0 , X t X ′ ) = ˆ e(g, C 1 ) . If the equality does 
not hold, B returns ⊥ and halts. Otherwise, B sets K = (K 1 , . . . , K n ) as 
K i = 
{
f gl ( ˆ  e(C 
z i 
0 , 

d 
i =0 (Y 
∗
i ) 
a i ) , R ) if i ∈ [ n \ i ∗] 
f gl ( ˆ  e( ¯X , 

d 
i =0 (Y 
∗
i ) 
a i ) , R ) if i = i ∗
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where X¯ = (C 1 /C ω 2 0 ) 1 / (ω 1 (t −t 
∗)) (note that t  = t ∗). 
Next, we discuss the correctness of all K i . 
Recall that Y ∗
i = g α
i 
(0 ≤ i ≤ n ) for some unknown α ∈ Z p . For i ∈ [ n i ∗], we have 
K i = f gl ( ˆ  e(C z i 0 , 
d i =0 (Y ∗i ) a i ) , R ) 
= f gl ( ˆ  e(C z i 0 , g 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i 
) , R ) 
= f gl ( ˆ  e(C 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i 
0 , Z i ) , R ) . 
For i = i ∗, since 
X¯ = (C 1 /C ω 2 0 ) 1 / (ω 1 (t −t 
∗)) 
= 
(
(X t X ′ ) r 
g rω 2 
) 1 
ω 1 (t −t ∗ ) 
= 
(
((g β ) ω 1 t (g β ) −ω 1 t 
∗
g ω 2 ) r 
g rω 2 
) 1 
ω 1 (t −t ∗ ) 
= (g β ) r , 
we have 
K i ∗ = f gl ( ˆ  e((g β ) r , 
d i =0 (Y ∗i ) a i ) , R ) 
= f gl ( ˆ  e((g β ) r , g 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i 
) , R ) 
= f gl ( ˆ  e(C 
∑ d 
i =0 a i α
i 
0 , Z i ∗ ) , R ) . 
Thus, B i ∗ correctly answers all RKA queries issued by A . 
Summary. As shown in the above discussion, the distributions of the system parameter, the public key and the RKA 
queries are identical to that in H i ∗ (and H i ∗−1 ). For the challenge key K ∗0 , if δ is an instance of distribution 	real , then 
we have L = f gl ( ˆ  e(g, g) αβγ , R ) . Thus the distribution of K ∗0 is identical to that in H i ∗−1 . If δ is an instance of distribution 
	rand , then L is a random ν bits string and the distribution of K 
∗
0 is identical to that in H i ∗ . Therefore, B i ∗ can use A 
to distinguish δ ∈ 	real from δ ∈ 	rand . This holds for all i ∗ ∈ [ n ]. Particularly, 
| Pr [ E i ∗ ] − Pr [ E i ∗−1 ] | ≤ Adv d−ebdh GL, B i ∗ (κ) . 
We conclude that 
| Pr [ S 6 ] − Pr [ S 5 ] | = | Pr [ E n ] − Pr [ E 0 ] | 
≤
n ∑ 
i =1 
| Pr [ E i ] − Pr [ E i −1 ] | 
≤ n · Adv d−ebdh 
GL, B ′′ (κ) . 
for some PPT adversary B ′′ attacking on the Goldreich–Levin hard-core function. 
Taking all things together, this completes the proof of Theorem 1 . 
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove this lemma, we introduce two hybrid games. 
• Game 4 . 1 : This game is the same as Game 4 , except the following changes: (i) We keep the discrete logarithms of X and 
X ′ to the base g , i.e., we ﬁrst sample random x, x ′ ∈ Z p , and then set X = g x and X ′ = g x ′ ; (ii) We compute the challenge 
ciphertext C ∗
1 using (C 
∗
0 ) 
x ·t ∗+ x ′ instead of (X t X ′ ) r ∗ where r ∗ = log g C ∗0 ; (iii) We compute the challenge encapsulated key 
K ∗
0 using the secret key sk 
∗ = α instead of the witness r ∗ of C ∗
0 . That is, for each i , K 
∗
0 ,i is computed via f gl ( ˆ  e( C 
∗
0 
α
, Z i ) , R ) 
rather than f gl ( ˆ  e( Y 
∗r ∗ , Z i ) , R ) . Clearly, all these modiﬁcations are just conceptional, and hence 
Pr [ S 4 . 1 ] = Pr [ S 4 ] . 
• Game 4 . 2 : This game is identical to Game 4 . 2 , except that the challenger returns ⊥ and halts, if (C 0 , Y φ )  = (C ∗0 , Y ∗) but 
t = TCR (C 0 , Y φ ) = TCR (C ∗0 , Y ∗) = t ∗. We show that 
| Pr [ S 4 . 2 ] − Pr [ S 4 . 1 ] | ≤ Adv tcr TCR , B ′ (κ) 
for a PPT adversary B ′ attacking on TCR. 
Given a challenge TCR instance (A ∗, B ∗) ∈ G × G , we construct an eﬃcient algorithm S to simulate Game 4 . 1 . Without lossy 
of generality, we assume that the group G comes from some bilinear group ( ˆ  e, G , G T , p) generated by PGen (1 
κ ) . The 
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simulator ﬁrst chooses random elements α, x, x ′ ∈ Z p , and sets g = B ∗
1 
α , sk ∗ = α, X = g x and X ′ = g x ′ . So, the challenge 
public key is pk ∗ = Y ∗ = g α = B ∗. The simulator then generates the other elements of the system parameter as in Game 4 . 1 . 
Next, the simulator sets C ∗0 = A ∗, and computes {
C ∗1 = (A ∗) x ·t 
∗+ x ′ , where t ∗ = TCR (C ∗0 , Y ∗) 
K ∗
0 ,i = f gl ( ˆ  e( A ∗α, Z i ) , R ) , for i ∈ [ n ] 
. 
Observe that the simulated challenge ciphertext (C ∗0 , C 
∗
1 ) and K 
∗
0 have the same distributions as that in Game 4 . 1 . For any 
RKA queries ( φ, ( C 0 , C 1 )), the simulator can also answer the adversary’s query using α and keep the tuple ( C 0 , Y φ), where 
Y φ = g φ(α) . Finally, the simulator checks whether there exists same tuple ( C 0 , Y φ) satisfying TCR (C 0 , Y φ ) = TCR (C ∗0 , Y ∗) 
but (C 0 , Y φ )  = (C ∗0 , Y ∗) . If so, the simulator outputs such tuple to its own TCR challenger. By the TCR assumption, such 
event occurs with probability at most Adv tcr 
TCR , B ′ (κ) . Since Game 4 . 2 is identical to Game 4 . 1 unless this event occurs, we 
have | Pr [ S 4 . 2 ] − Pr [ S 4 . 1 ] | ≤ Adv tcr TCR , B ′ (κ) . 
Recall that Game 5 is identical to Game 4 . 2 , except that the challenge ciphertext is again computed using the witness r 
∗ of 
C ∗0 . So, the difference between these two games is conceptional. This ﬁnishes the proof of Lemma 2 . 
3.3. Reducing pairings in encapsulation 
One drawback of the above scheme is that the encapsulation algorithm requires too many pairings. In general, computing 
the pairing is much slower than an exponentiation. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a simple way to reduce the num- 
ber of pairings in the encryption algorithm. The idea is to precompute the pairings ˆ Z i = ˆ e(Y, Z i ) for i ∈ [ n ], and add these val- 
ues into the public key. Concretely, the variant scheme KEM ′ = ( KEM ′ . Sys , KEM ′ . Gen , KEM ′ . Encap , KEM ′ . Decap ) is the same 
as our original KEM scheme described in Section 3.1 , except the following two differences in KEM ′ . Sys and KEM ′ . Encap : 
1. In KEM ′ . Sys , the system parameter is modiﬁed to 
pk = (Y, ˆ  Z 1 , . . . , ˆ  Z n ) , 
where Y = g α for some secret key sk = α, and ˆ Z i = ˆ e(Y, Z i ) . 
2. On input a public key pk = (Y, ˆ  Z 1 , . . . , ˆ  Z n ) , the encapsulation algorithm KEM ′ . Encap picks a random r ∈ Z p and then 
computes 
C 0 = g r C 1 = (X t X ′ ) r K = 
(
f gl ( ˆ  Z 
r 
i , R ) 
)
i ∈ [ n ] 
where t = TCR (C 0 , Y ) . Return (( C 0 , C 1 ), K ). 
We claim that the RKA-security of the variant KEM scheme is the same as that of the original KEM scheme, i.e., we have 
the following theorem. 
Theorem 2. For any PPT poly( d ) -RKA adversary A that makes at most q = poly (κ) RKA queries, there exist adversaries B ′ and 
B ′′ of roughly the same complexity as A , such that 
Adv 
poly (d) −rka 
KEM ′ , A (κ) ≤ Adv tcr H, B ′ (κ) + n · Adv d−ebdh GL, B ′′ (κ) + 
q 
p 
where p is the order of the underlying bilinear group G . 
The proof of the above theorem is almost identical to that of Theorem 1 , except that we need to simulate the elements 
ˆ Z i of the challenge public key pk in Game 6 . Observe that the simulator can compute ˆ Z i from the values Y 
∗ and Z i using 
pairing ˆ e(Y ∗, Z i ) , where Y ∗ comes from the challenge d -EBDH instance and Z i are chosen by the simulator itself. In this way, 
the challenge public key pk = (Y ∗, ˆ  Z 1 , . . . , ˆ  Z n ) can be simulated by the simulator. We omit the formal security proof. 
4. Comparison 
In this section, we compare our result with previous known RKA-secure public key primitives, including public-key 
encryption (PKE), identity-based encryption (IBE) and key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM), in terms of RKD function 
classes and assumptions. Note that, the later two primitives imply RKA-secure PKE schemes in a modular and eﬃcient way. 
According to the framework proposed by Bellare, Cash and Miller [5] , RKA-secure pseudo-random functions (PRFs) can be 
used to construct other primitives for the same set of RKD functions. We omit the comparison with the results obtained 
from the RKA-PRFs, as the best result from RKA-PRFs does not surpass the best result from RKA-PKE or RKA-KEM. 
It has been shown in Table 1 that our result achieves non-linear RKA security from search problem while the others rely 
on decisional assumptions with the exception of Wee’s factoring-based construction and Cui et al.’s work. Note that Cui 
et al.’s method requires extra operations of computing a commitment and verifying the commitment, while our method 
only involves an extra operation of computing one exponentiation in the decryption. Our polynomial RKA security is 
obtained from a slightly less standard search problem, i.e., the d -extended BDH problem. This limitation exists in Cui et al.’s 
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Table 1 
Summary of existing RKA-secure PKE, IBE and KEM schemes. The KEM schemes also rely on a TCR function. We do not write it explicitly in the ﬁgure, as 
TCR function can be constructed under discrete logarithm assumption, which is weaker than the other assumptions. In the table, “HR”, “QR” and “DCR”
stand for “Higher Residuosity assumption”, “Quadratic Residuosity assumption” and “Decisional Composite Residuosity assumption” respectively. 
Scheme Primitive Assumption RKD functions Search problem 
[41] PKE DBDH Linear ✗ 
[7] IBE DBDH Aﬃne ✗ 
[7] IBE d -EDBDH Polynomial ✗ 
[7] KEM DBDH Aﬃne ✗ 
[32] PKE DDH/HR Aﬃne ✗ 
[31] PKE DCR/QR Aﬃne ✗ 
[21] KEM DBDH Invertible ✗ 
[21] IBE DBDH Invertible ✗ 
[41] PKE Factoring Linear  
[20] a PKE d -EBDH Restricted functions  
Sections 3.1 and 3.3 KEM BDH Aﬃne  
Sections 3.1 and 3.3 KEM d -EBDH Polynomial  
a Obtained via applying their framework to the HJKS-KEM scheme under the d -EBDH assumption. 
Table 2 
Eﬃciency comparison. 
Scheme Param. pk sk CT Encap. Decap. RKA 
# G [# G , # G T ] # Z p # G [# Exp . , # Pairing ] 
[26] n + 1 [1, 0] 1 2 [ n + 3 , n ] [ n + 1 , n + 2] unknow 
Scheme 3.1 n + 1 [1, 0] 1 2 [ n + 3 , n ] [ n + 2 , n + 2] Yes 
Scheme 3.3 n + 1 [1, n ] 1 2 [ n + 3 , 0] [ n + 2 , n + 2] Yes 
method too. We leave it as a further work to construct RKA-secure primitives from standard search problems, such as BDH 
and factoring, for polynomial and even invertible RKD functions. 
In Table 2 , we also compare our schemes with the original CCA-secure HJKS-KEM scheme, in terms of key and cipher- 
text sizes, encapsulation and decapsulation computations. For the system parameter size, we do not consider the size of 
the group description, TCR functions and the hard-core function. In encapsulation and decapsulation, we only consider the 
dominating computations, including exponentiation ( Exp. ) and pairing ( Pairing ), omitting the computations of TCR function 
and some constant number of multiplications. Table 2 shows that, to achieve RKA security, our two schemes only add an 
extra exponentiation in the decapsulation of the original HJKS-KEM scheme. Moreover, the second scheme even eliminates 
the n pairings in the encapsulation with the price of a pre-computation of n pairings in the public key. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we presented an eﬃcient key-encapsulation mechanism that is secure against polynomial related-key 
attacks in the standard model. Different from previous polynomial-RKA secure encryption schemes, the construction is 
based on a hard search problem, namely, d -extended BDH, rather than decisional problems. It is also the ﬁrst aﬃne-RKA 
secure encryption scheme under the BDH assumption. However, like in previous RKA-secure primitives, to protect against 
polynomial RKD functions, we rely on a less standard assumption. It remains an open problem to construct RKA-secure 
primitives, such as KEM/PKE for larger classes of RKD functions from standard search assumptions. 
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